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COLONIAL LEGACIES IN SYRIAN NATIONALITY 
LAW AND THE RISK OF STATELESSNESS 
 
MALAK BENSLAMA-DABDOUB* 
The millions of Syrians born or living in exile as a result of the ongoing conflict has dramatically 
increased the number of people from Syria with no nationality. In this regard, Syrian nationality 
law has been criticised for containing discriminatory provisions and failing to address the risk of 
statelessness. Nonetheless, the responsibility of colonialism in creating such discrimination has 
been largely overlooked. One decade after the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, this article looks 
back at the colonial roots of Syrian legislation governing nationality. Through a critical legal and 
historical analysis, it reveals the hidden colonial legacies of Syrian citizenship, by highlighting the 
responsibility of European colonial powers in introducing gender-based discrimination in 
domestic legislation, rendering Kurds and Palestinians stateless, and creating the practice of 
arbitrary denationalisation. This paper ends with a call for more research on colonial legacies 
within citizenship and statelessness studies.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
The issue of citizenship and statelessness in Syria has been brought to the 
foreground by the forced displacement of nearly 13 million people since the 
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outbreak of the civil war in 2011.1 Although political instability coupled with mass 
displacement of populations has dramatically increased the risk of statelessness in 
the country, Syrian legislation was already criticised for being discriminatory and 
for failing to prevent statelessness before the conflict began. Indeed, the Syrian 
Legislative Decree 276 (‘Syrian Nationality Law’) is based on the principle of 
paternal jus sanguinis, which means that only men can pass on their citizenship to 
their children.2 In the current context of the civil war, many fathers have died, 
disappeared or simply abandoned their children — to the point that around a 
quarter of Syrian refugee households are now solely led by women.3 Gender-based 
discrimination in Syrian nationality law has significantly increased the risk of 
statelessness, especially among the 1 million Syrian children born in exile.4 The 
civil war has furthermore exacerbated the situation of Kurds and Palestinian 
refugees in Syria, who are legally excluded from Syrian citizenship and 
naturalisation rules, and have been living in statelessness for decades.5 This 
situation is incompatible with many international human rights law treaties ratified 
by Syria, which protect the right to a nationality.6 The question of citizenship is 
indeed a major issue, especially for Syrians born and/or living in exile. In 2015, 
Syrian authorities removed major restrictions on the process of applying for and 
renewing Syrian passports from embassies.7 Following this decision, a record 
number of Syrian passport applications have been registered in embassies, which 
illustrates how fundamental it is for refugees to secure a passport.8 Ten years after 
the outbreak of the war, this paper looks back at Syrian legislation on nationality, 
and the resulting risks of statelessness. 
 
1   Elizabeth Ferris, and Kemal Kirisci, The Consequences of Chaos: Syria's Humanitarian 
Crisis and the Failure to Protect (Brookings Institution Press 2016) 1. 
2   Legislative Decree 276 ‘Nationality Law’ (1969) art 3 (Syrian Arab Republic) 
<https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4d81e7b12.pdf> (‘Syrian Nationality Law’). 
3   Woman Alone: The Fight for Survival by Syria’s Refugee Women (Report, UNHCR 2 July 
2014) <https://www.refworld.org/docid/53be84aa4.html> (‘Woman Alone’). 
4   ‘Syria Refugee Crisis Explained’ (n 1); Charlie Dunmore, ‘Born in Exile, Syrian Children 
Face Threat of Statelessness’, UNHCR (Web Page, 4 November 2014) 
<https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/latest/2014/11/54589fb16/born-exile-syrian-children-face-
threat-statelessness.html>. 
5   Thomas McGee, From Syria to Europe: Experiences of Stateless Kurds and Palestinian 
Refugees from Syria Seeking Protection in Europe (Report, Institute of Statelessness and 
Inclusion 2019). 
6   See, eg, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 
183rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948) art 15 (‘UDHR’); International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 
171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 24(3) (‘ICCPR’). 
7   Previously, Syrians who had left the country ‘illegally’ had to go through an ‘intelligence 
service review’ in order to obtain a Syrian passport. Relevant Country of Origin Information 
to Assist with the Application of UNHCR's Country Guidance on Syria: ‘Illegal Exit’ from 
Syria and Related Issues for Determining the International Protection Needs of Asylum-
Seekers from Syria (Report, UNHCR February 2017). 
8   ‘Syria Government Profits from Hike in Passport Demand’, Middle East Eye (online, 26 
October 2015) <http://bit.ly/2k39x7C>; 800.000 Neue Pässe ‘Ausgegeben: Syriens Regime 
Verdient Gut an Flüchtlingen’, Der Tagesspiegel (online, 5 November 2015) 
<http://bit.ly/2aFbeot>. 




Although the current academic literature has clearly identified and criticised 
the flaws and discrimination in Syrian nationality law,9 the impact of colonialism 
in creating such discrimination has been largely neglected. Yet, Syrian legislation 
on nationality — as we know it today — has been directly influenced by 
colonialism and imperialism.10 French colonisation of Syria, which lasted from 
1922 to 1946,11 played a pivotal role in the development of Syrian citizenship. 
Nonetheless, the academic literature on this topic is relatively scarce partially 
because France refused to open its colonial archives until 1987.12 Moreover, the 
Western academic scholarship on Syrian citizenship fails to take into 
consideration colonial legacies. This article fills this research gap by exploring the 
role of colonialism calls in shaping Syrian nationality laws and creating risks of 
statelessness. In doing so, it builds upon postcolonial scholarship and third world 
approaches to international law (‘TWAIL’). Through an anti-colonial analysis, 
this paper proceeds with a historico-legal analysis of Syrian citizenship rules and 
current situations of statelessness.  
Before French colonisation formally began in 1922, Syria lived under Ottoman 
rule for more than four centuries.13 During World War I, the Allies needed the 
support of Arabic-speaking populations in order to defeat the Ottomans. 
Thereafter, Britain promised Arab leaders the creation of a sovereign and 
independent ‘Arab State’, in exchange of their military and political support 
against the Ottomans.14 Arab leaders, who were looking to end four centuries of 
Ottoman occupation, accepted and fought alongside the Allies during World War 
 
9   Zahra Albarazi, The Stateless Syrians (Report No 11/2013, Tilburg University 2013) (‘The 
Stateless Syrians’); David M Howard, ‘Analyzing the Causes of Statelessness in Syrian 
Refugee Children’ (2017) 52(1) Texas International Law Journal 221; Submission to the 
Human Rights Council at the 26th Session of the Universal Periodic Review (Report, Institute 
on Statelessness and Inclusion and The Global Campaign for Equal Nationality Rights 24 
March 2016) <https://equalnationalityrights.org/images/zdocs/ISI-GCENR---UPR-
Submission-Syria---March-2016-Final.pdf>. 
10   Elizabeth F Thompson, Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender 
in French Syria and Lebanon (Columbia University Press 2000); The Stateless Syrians (n 9). 
11   Daniel Neep, Occupying Syria under the French Mandate (Cambridge University Press 2012) 
3. 
12   Peter A Shambrook, French Imperialism in Syria, 1927–1936 (Ithaca Press 1998) preface.  
13   Ma'oz, Moshe, Yosef Ginat and Onn Winckler, Modern Syria: From Ottoman Rule to Pivotal 
Role in the Middle East (Sussex Academic Press, 1999); James L Gelvin, Divided Loyalties: 
Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire (University of California Press, 
1998). The Ottoman Empire ruled over Syria from 1516 to 1918. The period is referred to as 
the Ottoman ‘occupation’ and not ‘colonisation’ for a series of reasons. Firstly, major 
European colonial powers (such as Britain, France, Spain and Portugal) organised large-scale 
migrations by sending colonial settlers in their overseas territories. For instance, more than 
1.6 million French citizens were living in Algeria before the country obtained independence. 
On the other hand, the Ottomans were not looking to ‘replace’ native populations. Secondly, 
behind European colonisation lies a discourse and policies of racial hierarchy and civilisation 
claims. European conquests justified their brutal rule and occupation on the basis that they 
had a duty to bring enlightenment to ‘the barbarians’. On the other hand, the Ottomans did 
not reproduce such ‘civilising discourse’ and recognised that that their conquests were solely 
motivated by economic/military ambitions. Thirdly, Ottoman rule was not an alien non-
consensual rule. The Ottomans did not try to impose their language and customs, did not seek 
to divide local populations and left a relative political autonomy to regions of the empire. 
Fourthly, European colonial powers forcibly enforced cultural conversions, language spread 
and religious change. A contrario, the Turks were not looking to impose any cultural or 
linguistic change. Finally, the Ottomans conquered and occupied territories that were adjacent 
to their homelands, in an effort to ‘expand’ their territory. Conversely, European colonial 
powers established settlements in lands scattered all over the world, including in America, 
Africa, Asia and Australia. 
14   Correspondence between Henry McMahon and Hussein ibn Ali, July 1915 – March 1916. 
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I.15 After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the Syrian National Congress issued 
a declaration of independence on 8 March 1920, creating the sovereign State of 
‘Bidal al-Sham’ or ‘Greater Syria’. This State was a democratic parliamentary 
monarchy, which covered the current territories of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, 
Palestine and Israel.16 The 1920 Constitution of the Syrian Arab Kingdom 
instituted a separation of powers, established a legislative control of the monarch’s 
prerogatives, removed Islam as the State religion, and granted equal rights to all 
citizens regardless of their ethnicity or religious beliefs.17 Unfortunately, the 
Allies refused to keep their initial promise and chose, instead, to colonise the Arab 
provinces of the Ottoman Empire.18 Britain and France were looking to pursue 
their colonial, political and economic aspirations — and had no desire to uphold 
Syrians’ aspirations for self-government and independence. Britain was looking 
to safeguard the route to India and secure oil for the navy, while France wanted to 
secure cheap supply of cotton and silk.19 In July 1920, British and French military 
troops forced political leaders into exile.20 In order to contain nationalist 
movements and reinforce their domination, the Anglo–French alliance cut down 
the Arab provinces and drew artificial borders in the secret 1916 Sykes–Picot 
Agreement negotiations (‘Sykes–Picot Agreements’), without any consideration 
for the local population.21 Britain seized power over Mesopotamia, the Gulf and 
Palestine, whilst France took control over the Levant (ie Syria and Lebanon).22 
This colonial mapping was motivated by divide-and-rule policy, a political 
strategy whereby a dominant power maintains control over a land by dividing its 
people, thereby preventing from uniting in opposition.23 This colonial enterprise 
created a mismatch between identity and nationality that is partially responsible 
for the current plight of statelessness in Syria — and largely, in the Middle East. 
 
15   Trevor J Le Gassick, ‘Studies in Contemporary Arab Nationalist Literature’ (DPhil thesis, 
SOAS University 2015) 6. 
16   Elizabeth F Thompson, How the West Stole Democracy from the Arabs (Grove Press 2020) 
xi. 
17   Yusuf Mazin, The Syrian Congress: the Independent Parliament of Greater Syria (Dar al-
Sharq 2011), citing the Constitution of the Syrian Arab kingdom 1920 (no longer in force); 
Elizabeth F Thompson ‘Rashid Rida and the 1920 Syrian–Arab Constitution: How the French 
Mandate Undermined Islamic liberalism’ in Cyrus Schayegh and Andrew Arsan (eds), The 
Routledge Handbook of the History of the Middle East Mandate (Routledge 2015) 244. 
18   Ernest C Dawn, ‘From Ottomanism to Arabism: The Origin of an Ideology’ (1961) 23(3) The 
Review of Politics 378; Zeine N Zeine, Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab 
Nationalism (Khayat’s, 1958) 58. See also Rashid Khalidi et al (eds) The Origins of Arab 
Nationalism (Columbia University Press 1991). 
19   Shambrook (n 12) 1. See also Gibbons Herbert Adams, The Defects of the System of 
Mandates (1921) 96(1) Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 84; 
Ayse Tekdal Fildis, ‘The Troubles in Syria: Spawned by French Divide and Rule’ (2011) 
18(4) Middle East Policy 129. 
20   Gassick (n 15) 4–5; Reem Abou‐El‐Fadi, ‘Early Pan‐Arabism in Egypt’s July Revolution: 
The Free Officers Political Formation and Policy‐making, 1946–54’ (DPhil thesis, SOAS 
University 2015) 289; Thompson (n 10) xv. 
21   James Barr, A Line In The Sand: Britain, France and the Struggle that Shaped The Middle 
East (Simon and Schuster, 2011) 6–12. 
22   This division was formalised in the secret Sykes–Picot Agreement (entered into force 3 
January 1916). See Meir Zamir, The Secret Anglo–French War in the Middle East: 
Intelligence and Decolonization, 1940–1948 (Routledge 2014) 8. 
23   See Richard Morrock, ‘Heritage of Strife: The Effects of Colonialist “Divide and Rule” 
Strategy upon the Colonized Peoples’ (1973) 37(2) Science & Society 129; Nic Cheeseman, 
Eloïse Bertrand, and Sa’eed Husaini 'Divide and Rule' in A Dictionary of African Politics 
(Oxford University Press 2019). 




Yet, international law on statelessness and citizenship utterly overlooks the 
importance of (de)colonial legacies.24 Both the 1954 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness (‘Statelessness Conventions’) are based on the premises that 
statelessness is principally due to a conflict of nationality laws, arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality or gender-based discrimination, but disregard the large-
scale impact of colonialism in creating statelessness.25 In this regard, TWAIL 
offer a valuable standpoint in deconstructing the colonial features and effects of 
international law.26 Through a critical legal analysis, TWAIL scholars seek to 
challenge the supposedly ‘universality’ of international law and demonstrate how 
the international legal framework perpetuate unequal power relations. Notably, 
TWAIL scholarship questions the premises that international human rights law 
instruments are emancipatory. Rather, they emerge as Eurocentric projects, 
exclusively drafted by wealthy powerful nations, in an attempt to reinforce the 
dominance of the ‘Global North’ over the ‘Global South’, and the subordination 
of non-Europeans to Europeans.27 In doing so, TWAIL scholars notably rely on a 
critical historical perspective on the foundations of international law. 
Against this background, this article aims at filling the existing research gap by 
exploring Syrian nationality legislation and statelessness through an anti-colonial 
perspective. This paper builds upon TWAIL scholarship in an effort to deconstruct 
and uncover the hidden colonial features of Syrian citizenship. Ultimately, this 
paper argues that discriminatory provisions in Syrian nationality laws and the 
resulting risk of statelessness bear the legacies of European colonialism and 
hegemony. This analysis starts first by offering a historical context on the colonial 
history and formation of Syria as a modern nation-State. The following Part 
exposes the colonial responsibility in introducing gender-based discrimination in 
Syrian citizenship, and in depriving the Kurds and Palestinians from their right to 
self-determination. Part V explores arbitrary deprivation of nationality in Syria as 
an act inspired by European practices. Finally, this paper ends with concluding 
thoughts, summarising the main findings and calling for the value of an anti-
colonial analysis of citizenship. 
 
24   Malak Benslama-Dabdoub, ‘Decolonising Statelessness: Unpacking Colonial Legacies and 
Deconstructing Forms of Epistemic Violence’, CSS Blog, University of Melbourne (Blog 
Post, January 2021) <https://law.unimelb.edu.au/centres/statelessness/critical-statelessness-
studies-blog/decolonising-statelessness-unpacking-colonial-legacies-and-deconstructing-
forms-of-epistemic-violence>. 
25   See Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, opened for signature 28 September 
1954, 360 UNTS 117 (entered into force 6 June 1960); Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness, opened for signature 30 August 1961, 989 UNTS 185 (entered into force 13 
December 1975). 
26   James Thuo Gathii, ‘Rejoinder: TWAILing International Law’ (1999) 98(6) Michigan Law 
Review 2066; Makau Mutua and Antony Anghie, ‘What is TWAIL?’ [2000] 94 Proceedings 
of the Annual Meeting (The American Society of International Law) 31; Obiora Chinedu 
Okafor, 'Critical Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): Theory, 
Methodology, or Both?’ (2008) 10(4) International Community Law Review 371; Luis Eslava 
and Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Between Resistance and Reform: TWAIL and the Universality of 
International Law’ (2011) 3(1) Trade, Law and Development 103; Luis Eslava and Sundhya 
Pahuja, ‘Beyond the (Post) Colonial: TWAIL and the Everyday Life of International Law’ 
(2012) 45(2) Verfassung und Recht in Übersee/Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America 195. 
27   Ratna Kapur, Gender, Alterity and Human Rights: Freedom in a Fishbowl (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2018). 
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 HISTORICAL CONTEXT: EUROPEAN COLONIALISM AND THE FORMATION OF 
SYRIA AS A MODERN STATE  
A The Dislocation of the Ottoman Empire and Creation of Artificial 
Nationalities 
In order to understand the current rules governing Syrian citizenship, it is 
necessary to trace back the historical formation of Syria as a nation-state. After 
the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Britain and France instituted a system of 
‘Mandates’ in order to maintain their control over the Fertile Crescent.28 Under 
this system, which was approved by the League of Nations, ‘Mandatory’ powers 
were in charge of ‘assisting’ native peoples who were ‘not able to stand by 
themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world’.29 The Allies 
deemed that this system of tutelage was the appropriate solution for what they 
regarded as ‘politically backward people’ incapable of governing themselves. 30 
The occupation of Syria was based on a colonial organisation and imperial 
discourse that saw native populations in the Middle East as inferior, uncivilised 
and incapable of administrating themselves. The former French Prime Minister 
Alexandre Millerand declared in 1919 that France had ‘a sacred duty’ to help 
Syrians ‘realise their legitimate aspirations’ and ‘organise themselves as 
nations’.31 Yet, when the Syrian people issued a declaration of independence in 
1920, and created a sovereign State based on principles of democracy and equality, 
the Anglo–French Alliance forcibly crushed them down, and forced their political 
leaders to exile. By doing this, Elizabeth F Thompson claims that ‘Europeans stole 
Arab democracy and expelled Syria from the so-called civilised world’.32 As a 
result, the paternalist discourse that sought to justify European occupation, on the 
basis of a duty to so-called ‘assist’ native populations in ‘governing themselves’ 
was a fallacy aimed at disguising colonialism. 
Although the League of Nations expressly stated in its declaration that the 
Mandatory power shall ‘encourage local autonomy’ and ‘take into account the 
rights, interests and wishes of the population’,33 France treated its possessions in 
the Levant as part of its colonial empire.34 The brutality of French colonial rule in 
Syria proved that France never sought to bring autonomy to native populations. In 
fact, France took de facto control over Syria in 1918–19, but the League of Nations 
established the Mandates System only three years later. Therefore, the System of 
Mandates provided a legal formula for colonisation and the League of Nations had 
 
28   This division was agreed during the Anglo–French Conference of San Remo, in April 1920. 
See David Kenneth Fieldhouse, Western Imperialism in the Middle East 1914–1958 (Oxford 
University Press 2006) 36–41. 
29   Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, signed 28 June 
19191, 225 ConTS 188 (entered into force 10 January 1920) art 22(1) (‘Covenant of the 
League of Nations’). 
30   Quincy Wright, ‘The United States and the Mandates’ (1925) 23(7) Michigan Law Review 
722. 
31   Safiuddin Joarder, Syria under the French Mandate: The Early Phase 1920–1927 (Asiatic 
Society of Bangladesh Publications, 1977) iv.  
32   Thompson, How the West Stole Democracy (n 16) xiii. 
33   ‘Annex 391a: French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon’ (1922) 3(8) League of Nations 
Official Journal 1013, 1013–17. 
34   Joarder (n 31) iv. 




no say over France's presence in Syria.35 According to the Syrian nationalist leader 
Shakib Arslan:  
It should be clearly understood that the League of Nations, from the Syrian point 
of view, is simply an institution whose aim is to provide a clock of legality for the 
greedy encroachments of France and England.36 
For the first time, Syrians experienced how international law upholds and 
reinforces imperial ambitions by sanitising colonial language. In this regard, the 
League of Nations provided a prelude to the United Nations’ mechanisms to serve 
imperial ambitions and reinforce inequality among states. This is what Erakat 
refers to as ‘the sordid origin of international law as a derivative of a colonial 
order’.37 In effect, the idea that the Mandates System somehow benefited local 
populations is contradicted by historical evidence which illustrates the violence of 
French colonial rule in Syria. The French Mandatory power exercised a unilateral 
rule that left no autonomy to Syrians. France started first by institutionalising a 
framework that enabled the colonial administration to enact legislation without 
consulting the Syrian population. Rather than recognising the purely economic 
and political motivations behind colonialism, France justified its colonial 
conquests by advancing the duty of mission ‘civilisatrice’ — the ‘civilising’ 
mission. According to this notion, Europeans had a ‘moral duty’ to ‘civilise’ 
indigenous people by occupying them and expropriating their resources.38 To 
quote the words of the French Prime Minister in 1885, ‘the superior races … have 
the duty to civilize the inferior races’.39 In 1920, a French statesman addressed the 
Parliament about the Mandate over Syria and declared: ‘we have the duty to stay 
there and bring autonomy to these people we taught liberty to and whom, without 
us, might fall back into the despotism of fanaticism’.40 French authorities 
fabricated a false narrative of Arab extremism and Islamic fanaticism, and how 
the occupation of Syria was the only solution to counter such threat to peace.41 
In reality, French colonial occupation brought land exploitation and tyranny — 
not freedom and autonomy. Today, the vast majority of historians reject the fallacy 
that French rule in Syria — and colonialism in general — aimed at advancing the 
rule of law and was emancipatory.42 Philip S Khoury argues that France carried 
 
35   Shambrook (n 12) 2. 
36   Joarder (n 31) iii. 
37   Noura Erakat, Justice for Some: Law and the Question of Palestine (Stanford University Press 
2019) 6. 
38   Mathew Burrows, ‘“Mission Civilisatrice”: French Cultural Policy in the Middle East 1860–
1914’ (1986) 29(1) The Historical Journal 112. 
39   Jules Ferry, ‘Speech before the French Chamber of Deputies’ (Speech, Paris, 28 March 1884).  
40   Journal officiel de la République française: Débats parlementaires. Chambre des députés : 
compte rendu in-extenso (Archived Debate, 26 June 1920) 2464 
<https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k6331074c/f2.item> (tr author). The French original 
version is:  
nous nous devons de rester là-bas et … amener normalement à l'autonomie ces peuples 
que nous avons éveillés a la liberté et qui, sans nous, risquent de retomber sous le 
despotisme du fanatisme.  
41   Thompson, How the West Stole Democracy (n 16) xvi. 
42   Munir Al-Rayyis, The Golden Book of Nationalist Revolutions in the Arab East [ لكتاب الذھبي
العربي  المشرق  في  الوطنیة   ;Dar al-Tali‘a li-al-Taba‘a wa al-Nashr, 1969) vol 1, 142) [للثورات 
Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, ‘The Climax of French Imperial Expansion 1914–1924’ 
(Stanford University Press 1981) 14–21; Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism (New York 
University Press 2000) 32; Joarder (n 31) 73. 
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out ‘a dictatorial policy’ in Syria,43 and James Barr describes French rule in the 
Levant as ‘arbitrary, confessional, exploitative and corrupt’.44 The colonial 
administration enacted sectarian policies to reinforce its domination and power. 
France applied the ‘divide-and-rule’ policy in all its colonies,45 including Syria, 
and broke down national unity by conducting a policy of sectarian division,46 
ethnic segregation47 and regional separatism48 in order to maintain its influence.49 
Notably, it did so by creating the State of Lebanon in 1920 and by fragmenting 
Syrian territories into religious and ethnic communities.50 This politics was part 
of a colonial effort to racialise religious and ethnic communities.51 For instance, 
the Alawite and the Druze ethnic minorities were administrated separately from 
the rest of the Syrian people.52 These politics of division had a damaging impact 
on the Levant and left long-lasting marks that can still be felt to this day.53 The 
outbreak of the 15-year civil war in Lebanon, and the rise of sectarianism in Syria 
is partially attributed to the strategy of division enacted by the French during the 
occupation.54 Overall, this political of division enacted by both France and Britain 
in the Middle East has created a mismatch between identity and nationality. 
Inevitably, this brutal colonial rule engendered resistance from the Syrian 
people. Peaceful anti-colonial protests took place at the beginning of the 
occupation, to which France responded with massive executions, forced exile and 
military operations.55 In the summer of 1925, an armed revolt broke down in the 
Druze Mountains of Syria, and later spread to the rest of the region.56 This uprising 
was described as ‘the largest [and] longest’ uprising that the Arab Middle East had 
ever seen before.57 France violently repressed this revolt by bombing Damascus 
for 24 hours, killing thousands of civilians and leaving the ancient city in ruins.58 
The Syrian people finally managed to achieve independence after the end of World 
War II. The last French soldier in Syria was expelled on 17 April 1946: this is 
annually commemorated by Syrians as their ‘Independence Day’.59 
 
43   Philip S Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920–
1945 (Princeton University Press 2014) 5. 
44   Barr (n 21) 2. 
45   Richard Morrock, ‘Heritage of Strife: The Effects of Colonialist “Divide and Rule” Strategy 
upon the Colonized Peoples’ (1973) 37(2) Science and Society 129; ‘Divide and Rule’ in Nic 
Cheeseman, Eloïse Bertrand, and Sa’eed Husaini (eds), A Dictionary of African Politics 
(Oxford University Press 2019). 
46   Ussama Makdisi, Age of Coexistence: The Ecumenical Frame and the Making of the Modern 
Arab World (University of California Press 2019) 3–4. 
47   Al-Rayyis (n 42) 112–31. 
48   Neep (n 11) 31. 
49   Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate (n 43) 11. 
50   Phillip S Khoury, ‘Syrian Urban Politics in Transition: The Quarters of Damascus During the 
French Mandate’ (1994) 16(4) International Journal of Middle East Studies 507, 508. 
51   Michael Fakhri, ‘Introduction: Questioning TWAIL's Agenda’ (2012) 14(1) Oregon Review 
of International Law 1. 
52   Fildis (n 20). 
53   Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate (n 43) 58. 
54   Christian Velud, ‘Le mandat Français’ in Anne Marie Bianquis (ed), Damas: miroir brisé 
d'un Orient arabe (Autrement 1993) 87. 
55   ibid 196. 
56   ibid 199. 
57   Michael Provence, The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab Nationalism (University of 
Texas Press 2005) 12. 
58   ibid. 
59   Mouhmad Al-Hassan, ‘The French Mandate in Syria’ (DPhil thesis, University of Damascus 
1986) 32.  




It is the same politic of division that justified the creation of artificial borders 
by the Anglo–French alliance in the secret Sykes–Picot Agreements. France 
created the State of Lebanon in Syria60 and Britain divided Mesopotamia into the 
new states of Iraq and Jordan.61 Native populations disagreed with the new borders 
set up by European colonial powers. For instance, the decision to annex the 
Iskenderun Syrian district to the new State of Turkey, despite the fact that this 
region was populated by a vast majority of Arabs who spoke the Syrian dialect, 
was strongly contested.62 The creation and separation of Lebanon from Syria was, 
likewise, contested by native populations.63 Moreover, Britain promised to create 
‘a Jewish home’ in Palestine in the Balfour Declaration,64 paving the way for the 
mass displacement of millions of Palestinians and the current Israeli–Palestinian 
conflict.65 The Kurdish people were initially promised a State in the Treaty of 
Sèvres,66 but were later stripped of their right to self-determination67 after 
renegotiations with Turkey in the Treaty of Lausanne.68 As a result of this 
decision, the Kurds have been left without a state and form today the largest nation 
without a country in the world.69  
The dislocation of the former Ottoman Empire had a direct impact on 
citizenries that explain current nationality rules in the Middle East. With the 
creation of new states naturally came the necessity to determine which citizens 
belonged to each State.70 European colonial powers established the new 
nationality rules that would apply after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 
art 30 of the Treaty of Lausanne, according to which: 
Turkish subjects habitually resident in territory which in accordance with the 
provisions of the present Treaty is detached from Turkey will become … nationals 
of the State to which such territory is transferred.71 
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Accordingly, European colonial powers linked nationality to residency, without 
any regard to the lineage, ethnic identity or the place of birth of the individuals 
concerned. The creation by European colonial powers of the concept of ‘nation-
states’ in itself only aimed at reinforcing imperial dominance rather than 
benefiting local populations.72 Article 30 of the Treaty of Lausanne was 
implemented in all former provinces of the Ottoman Empire. In Syria, the French 
Mandate issued an arrêté73 that established the following golden rule: any 
inhabitant in Syrian territory was to be considered Syrian, except if they explicitly 
renounced their nationality.74 This was an artificial artefact because residency 
does not necessarily coincide with identity. Many populations displaced during 
the Ottoman Empire or after its fall, who sought refuge in Syria, had no ancestral 
link to the Syrian territory.75 The creation of artificial borders by colonial powers 
inevitably resulted in the creation of artificial nationalities. European jurists 
describe nationality as ‘the effective link’,76 ‘the genuine connection’77 and ‘un 
attachement réel’ — ‘a real connection’ — between the individual and the State.78 
It raises the question of whether nationality rules in the Middle East — and former 
colonised countries in general — can be considered ‘real’ or ‘genuine’, since they 
are the result of arbitrary colonial mapping.  
B Syrian Citizenship Post-Independence and the Influence of Pan-Arabism 
After the end of French colonial rule, Syrian citizenship went through three 
different stages. The first nationality legislation passed by independent Syria was 
the Law No 98 of 12 May 1951, later replaced by the Law No 21 of February 
1951.79 Citizenship rules were then modified by the Law No 82 of July 1958, after 
Syria joined the United Arab Republic. It was later abolished by Law No 67 of 
October 1961 after Syria left the union. Finally, Syrian nationality law went 
through a last modification in 1969, following the accession in power of the Baa’th 
party. This legislation still regulates Syrian citizenship to this day. Article 48 of 
the current Constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic states that nationality is 
regulated by a legislative act. As such, modifications in nationality rules do not 
require constitutional amendment. This sub-section critically engages with the 
evolution of Syrian citizenship post-independence through an anti-colonial lens. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the Anglo–French Alliance initially promised 
Arab populations the creation of an independent state in exchange for their 
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political and military support against the Ottomans.80 But after defeating the 
Ottomans, colonial powers did not keep their promise and crushed all political 
inspirations for Arab unity.81 Native populations were divided into artificial 
nation-states in order to contain nationalism and anti-colonial movements.82 After 
decolonisation, nationalists called for a reunification of all Arab states to 
overcome the divisions enacted during colonial rule. In this context, Pan-Arabism 
rose as a significantly strong and credible anti-colonial ideal. This project, also 
referred to as ‘Arab nationalism’, can be defined as a transnational and secular 
movement that advocates for the reunification of all Arab territories.83 Although 
the origins of this movement can be traced back to the Ottoman Empire,84 it 
emerged as a massive and popular ideology after World War I, both as an attempt 
to resist colonial rule and the creation of artificial borders by European powers. 
Arab nationalists advocate for the creation of a united Arab state, drawing on the 
historical example of the 12th century Arab Empire.85 
Pan-Arabism was formalised in different political projects,86 such as Nasserism 
in Egypt and Baathism in Iraq and Syria.87 Egypt and Syria managed to achieve 
this inspiration for Arab unity through the creation of a unified sovereign Arab 
state in 1946, called the United Arab Republic (‘UAR’).88 Yemen later signed a 
pact with the UAR in 1948 to be connected with a federation called the ‘United 
Arab States’ but without fully joining the union.89 During this period, all Syrians 
were considered nationals of the UAR.90 However, this union collapsed few years 
after, in 1961, following a coup d’état in Damascus.91 Although the creation of a 
unified Arab nation has not succeeded, Pan-Arabism has been translated in other 
forms of expressions, including intergovernmental cooperation between sovereign 
states. The most successful example of this expression is the League of Arab States 
(‘LAS’),92 a regional organisation framed around a common Arab identity and 
affinity. Within the past few decades, the definition of Pan-Arabism evolved, and 
is now broadly understood as ‘an idea and a movement that recognises the close 
affinity shared by the Arab people and attempts to give that affinity some 
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meaningful practical expression’.93 This broader understanding of Pan-Arabism 
does not assert that all Arab states should unify into one nation, but rather 
advocates for cooperation on the basis of this shared ‘Arab identity’. Whilst there 
are still ongoing debates about what this common identity rests upon, it emerges 
as a strong anti-colonial movement to rectify politics of division enacted during 
colonisation. 
Following the collapse of the UAR, Syria went through a period of political 
instability, with a succession of coups d’états and temporary governments that did 
not last more than five years.94 This ended in 1963, when the Ba’ath party seized 
power in a military coup d’état, and has been ruling the country ever since.95 
Ba’athism is a political movement that calls for the unification of all Arab 
territories into one single state, and advocates for the end of foreign interference.96 
The Pan-Arabist ideology of the Ba’ath party is strongly reflected in the current 
Syrian political and legal framework. According to the Constitution of the Syrian 
Arab Republic,97 the official name of the country is ‘Syrian Arab Republic’, 
described as ‘part of the Arab homeland’ and the Syrian people are considered 
‘part of the Arab nation’ with an ‘Arab identity’.98 Likewise, the preamble of the 
previous Syrian constitution, before it was amended in 2012, directly refers to the 
‘colonial conquests [that] shattered the Arab nation’s unity, occupied its territory, 
and plundered its resources’.99 The historical and political significance of Pan-
Arabism is also reflected in the current Syrian citizenship rules. Article 4(1)(f) of 
Syrian Nationality Law sets out the conditions for Syrian naturalisation as follows: 
(i) a five-year legal residency requirement; (ii) having full legal capacity; (iii) 
meeting certain medical conditions; (iv) having ‘good character’; (v) having 
legitimate means to earn a living; and (vi) being able to read and write Arabic.100 
These naturalisation criteria are quite lax compared to other countries of the 
Middle East and North Africa.101 However, Syrian naturalisation rules draw 
distinction between citizens of Arab countries and citizens of non-Arab countries. 
Overall, Syrian legislation distinguishes three categories of populations: Syrians, 
Arabs and other foreigners. The differences between Arabs and non-Arabs in 
naturalisation procedures are listed in Chapter 6 of the Syrian Nationality Law 
under the section ‘special provisions for other Arab nationals’. Article 6(3) states 
that the Minister of Interior can, at their discretion, waive regular conditions when 
the applicant is ‘of Arab origin’ and able to provide ‘a good reason’ for 
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naturalisation.102 At first glance, this provision raises serious concerns vis-à-vis 
the prohibition of discrimination in international law. Syria is a mosaic of diverse 
religions and ethnicities, including Alawites, Armenians, Assyrians, Chechens, 
Druze, Ismailis, Kurds and others.103 Syria has historically been a country of 
refuge for people fleeing neighbouring countries, regardless of their ethnicities or 
country of origin.104 Pan-Arabism is a political movement that goes beyond 
identity-based claims, and is framed around ideas of fraternity, shared heritage and 
common values.105  
Therefore, specific provisions in Syrian nationality law that favour ‘citizens of 
Arab origin’ need to be understood and analysed through an anti-colonial lens. 
Whilst certain provisions of Syrian legislation on nationality might appear as a 
form of ethnic discrimination at first, it actually stems from an anti-colonial 
movement that stroke for self-determination and ideals of equality. One must keep 
in mind that current nationality rules and borders in the Middle East are based on 
bogus colonial imaginaries, designed by former imperial powers, that do not 
reflect the identities of native populations. In that context, Pan-Arabism was 
initially conceived of as a resistance movement against colonial powers, revolving 
around the ideal of unity, not ethnic-based discrimination. It was a post-colonial 
effort to restore the existence of a democratic and independent Arab state 
aforementioned, which briefly existed under the rule of King Faisal in 1921. In 
fact, the declaration of independence issued by the Syrian Congress proclaimed a 
bill of rights, which included freedom of religion, freedom of press and equal 
citizenship for all residents of Syria.106 Thereafter, Pan-Arabism precisely aimed 
at restoring the sovereignty of Syrians, which was brutally crushed by European 
colonial powers. Equally, citizenship rules framed around Pan-Arabism aimed at 
unifying the citizens of Arabic-speaking countries who had suffered colonial 
decisions — regardless of their ethnicities or religious affiliation. As Fanon 
highlights, an important aspect of the anticolonial struggle is the unification of the 
natives under a common identity.107 Similarly to Pan-Arabism, Pan-Africanism is 
an anti-colonial movement that advocates for the reunification of all African 
territories.108 There were no borders in Africa before European colonial powers 
colonised the continent and divided it among themselves in the Berlin 
Conference.109 Pan-Africanism is an ideal that aimed at rectifying the devasting 
politics of division and separation enacted during colonial rule. Whilst this 
movement has never led to the creation of a unified African State, it encouraged 
and strengthened cooperation among sovereign nations. Overall, an anti-colonial 
analysis of Syrian citizenship reveals that certain forms of discrimination in Syrian 
naturalisation rules are the result of anti-colonial movements and resistance.  
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 GENDER-BASED RULES IN SYRIAN NATIONALITY LAW 
A The Introduction of Gender-Based Discrimination by the French Colonial 
Administration  
As mentioned in the introduction, Syrian citizenship is principally based on art 3 
of the Syrian Nationality Law, which provides that ‘anyone born inside or outside 
the country to a Syrian Arab father … shall be considered as Syrian Arab ipso 
facto’.110 This provision is the direct result of a patriarchal law introduced by the 
French colonial administration.111 From August 1924 to January 1925, the French 
High Commissioner112 issued a series of arrêtés113 laying down the legal 
framework on the transmission and acquisition of Syrian nationality.114 This 
patriarchal framework, directly inspired by French law itself,115 established the 
principle of paternal jus sanguinis,116 and made the acquisition of a woman’s 
nationality dependent on her husband’s.117 France also exported the principle of 
‘dependent nationality’, whereby a woman loses her nationality if she marries a 
foreigner.118 Until 1973, French nationality law was based upon the principle of 
patria potestas — ‘power of the father’ — under which a woman was subjected 
to her husband’s power.119 The introduction of this law represented a major step 
back for Syrian women who, under the Ottoman rule, enjoyed the right to pass on 
their nationality to their children on an equal basis with men.120 This historical fact 
challenges colonial and Orientalist discourses that blame patriarchal laws in the 
Middle East on a ‘barbaric culture’ or ‘backward religion’. On the contrary, this 
discriminatory legislation is the pure product of so-called European civilisation, 
which ostensibly claims to be superior.  
In this regard, it must be stressed out that the principle of paternal jus sanguinis 
was introduced by the French colonial administration following the transposition 
of the 1804 French Civil Code (‘Napoleonic Code’) into Syrian law.121 This code, 
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which represented the core of French civil law, was a compilation of patriarchal 
rules that subjected women to legal incapacity. Under this code, women were 
forced by law to obey their husbands,122 prohibited from securing their rights 
before Courts123 and unable to buy, give or sell their own goods without their 
husband’s approval.124F124 In short, French law viewed women as having the same 
legal capacity as criminals and children. One of the most fierce and misogynist 
provision of the Napoleonic Code was the ‘rape marriage law’, an article 
according to which a man who kidnapped or raped a girl could avoid prison by 
marrying his victim.125F125 This law, and the Napoleonic Code more generally, was 
exported by France in all its colonies, including in Lebanon, 126F126 Morocco,127F127 
Algeria128F128 and Tunisia.129F129 Although the Code was largely regarded as a symbol of 
progress and modernisation in Europe, 130F130 it represented a major step backwards 
for non-Western women. Before the Anglo–French occupation, Ottoman women 
enjoyed the right to sign binding contracts, to buy or sell goods without their 
husband’s permission and to secure their legal rights in court on their own 
behalf.131F131  
In fact, Turkish women obtained the right to vote in 1930, 14 years before 
French women did.132 Therefore, it is a colonial fallacy to maintain that European 
colonialism somehow brought ‘civilisation’ or enhanced gender equality of local 
populations.133 It actually had the opposite effect. This provision further illustrates 
how patriarchy is an inextricable part of the racism and brutality of colonialism. 
Although the oppressive colonial machinery was aimed at subjugating all native 
populations,134 it had a disproportionate impact on women. It seems like the so-
called ‘civilising mission’ put forward by the French was subjugating women, 
rather than about bringing civilisation. In this regard, it must be stressed that 
Britain introduced the same gender-based discrimination in its colonies, including 
in Jordan, Iraq and India, following a similar pattern.135 Both colonial powers are 
therefore responsible for introducing this patriarchal principle, and yet the 
 
122  ibid art 213. 
123  ibid arts 215, 221, 1124. 
124  Hanley (n 120). 
125  Rothna Begum, ‘Middle East on a Roll to Repeal “Marry the Rapist” Laws’, Human Rights 
Watch (online, 24 August 2017) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/24/middle-east-roll-
repeal-marry-rapist-laws>. 
126  Legislative Decree No 340 ‘Penal Code’ (1943) art 522 (Lebanon). Article repealed in August 
2017. ‘Lebanon Rape Law: Parliament Abolishes Marriage Loophole’, BBC News (online, 16 
August 2017) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-40947448>. 
127  Dahir No 1-59-413 ‘Code Penal’ (1962) 28 Joumada II 1382, art 475 (Morocco). Article 
repealed by Loi No 1-14-06 (2014) 18 Bulletin Officiel 2492. 
128  Ordonnance No 66-156 du 8 juin 1966 portant code penal (2011) art 308 (Algeria). Article 
repealed in 2017. 
129  Code Penal (1913) art 227 bis (Tunisia) (no longer in force). Article repealed in 2016. 
130  In Europe, the Napoleonic Code (n 118) was actually regarded as a symbol of modernisation 
and progress. See Xavier Martin, Fonction paternelle et Code Napoléon (Annales Historiques 
De La Révolution Française, 1996) 466. 
131  Zantout (n 115) 2. 
132  Valentine Moghadam, Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East 
(Lynne Rienner Publishers 1993) 91. 
133  Deniz Kandivoti, Gendering the Middle East: Emerging Perspectives (Syracuse University 
Press 1996). 
134  Fanon (n 107); Memni (n 72). 
135  Radha Govil and Alice Edwards, ‘Women, Nationality and Statelessness’ in Alice Edwards 
and Laura Van Waas (eds), Nationality and Statelessness under International Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2014) 169. 
Colonial Legacies in Syrian Nationality Law  
21 
 
majority of the Western academic literature fails to mention this colonial heritage 
and present gender inequality laws in Syria as a result of religious tradition or 
cultural ‘backwardness’.136 The patria potestas principle introduced by France is 
translated in art 30 of the current Syrian Nationality Law, which provides that ‘a 
minor shall have their father’s nationality’.137 This patriarchal rule also means that 
only Syrian men can pass on their citizenship to their spouse.138 Consequently, 
this example illustrates how citizenship regulation and statelessness can be the 
expression of both patriarchy139 and colonialism.140 The introduction of 
patriarchal provisions within nationality legislation is one of the major causes of 
statelessness in Syria. 
B The Impact of Gender-Based Discrimination on Statelessness  
Gender-based discrimination in nationality rules has been identified as one of the 
main causes of statelessness.141 Paternal jus sanguinis can lead to statelessness in 
situations whereby the father is stateless, unknown, has died before registering the 
child or simply refuses to recognise the child. In order to prevent such a situation, 
art 3 of the Syrian Nationality Law allows the acquisition of nationality to: ‘anyone 
born in the country to a Syrian Arab mother and whose legal family relationship 
to his father has not been established’.142 Nonetheless, this provision fails to tackle 
statelessness properly because it only concerns children born within the country 
and therefore excludes the ones born in exile. It furthermore refers to the status of 
the father instead of focusing on the risk of statelessness the child faces per se. As 
a result, art 3 is rarely implemented in practice143 because children born to 
unknown fathers face a series of bureaucratic barriers and social obstacles.144 
Notably, there is a strong social stigma surrounding children born out of 
wedlock145 or within terrorist organisations.146 Gender-biased laws are 
‘particularly hard on less-educated women, frequently from rural [areas], who 
married foreigners and had no resources for tracking the father or pursuing 
nationality claims for their children’.147 On the other hand, communities from 
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privileged, upper-class and educated backgrounds are more likely to overcome the 
social and bureaucratic obstacles aforementioned.148 Overall, the fact that 
statelessness is still perpetuated from generation to generation in Syria 
demonstrates how inefficient art 3 really is in preventing and eradicating 
statelessness.149  
In addition, the mass displacement of populations coupled with political 
instability and insecurity created by the 2011 civil war has dramatically increased 
the risk of statelessness in two ways. Firstly, many fathers have died, disappeared 
or simply abandoned their children during the war, making it more difficult to 
prove the paternal lineage to a Syrian father. UNHCR estimates that one-fourth of 
Syrian refugee households are led by women,150 and that over 300,000 Syrian 
children were born in exile between 2011 and 2016.151 Access to birth registration 
is primordial for Syrian children born outside the country because it provides 
evidence of their identity, their family links, and, as a result, their right to Syrian 
citizenship. According to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which Syria 
is a state party to, ‘each child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall 
have the right from birth to a name [and] the right to acquire a nationality’.152 Yet, 
the ongoing conflict makes it hard for Syrian families to register their childbirth, 
especially when the father is absent. Particularly, many Syrians living abroad are 
not aware of the necessity of registering their child at the nearest consulate,153 or 
had their identity documentation lost, stolen or destroyed during the war.154 In 
rebel-held areas, civil registration systems have not operated for years, leading to 
the impossibility of registering marriages, births and deaths — all of which can 
prevent access to nationality.155 As of July 2020, around 4.1 million Syrians were 
living in non-governmental controlled areas.156 In addition of the widespread loss 
of documentation in rebel-held territories, the validity of identity documents 
issued by non-state actors is disputed. All of these factors make it significantly 
challenging to prove Syrian citizenship, leading to a rise in the numbers of Syrians 
deprived of their right to nationality. Whilst the outbreak of the civil war coupled 
with gender-based discrimination has heightened the risk of statelessness, it is 
undoubtfully not a new phenomenon in Syria. Mass cases of statelessness existed 
before the conflict, especially among Kurds and Palestinians who have been 
deprived of nationality by colonialism. 
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 THE DEPRIVATION OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE KURDS 
AND PALESTINIANS 
Colonial policies have deprived both Kurds and Palestinians of their right to self-
determination, leaving them stateless and vulnerable to forced expulsion. Prior to 
the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, around 300,000 Kurds and more than 550,000 
Palestinian refugees living in Syria were de jure stateless.157 Although Kurds and 
Palestinians are both ‘a people without a country’,158 their legal status in Syrian 
legislation differs significantly. This section proceeds to analyse the responsibility 
of colonialism in creating statelessness among Palestinians and Kurds, and their 
legal status in Syrian citizenship. 
A British Support for Zionism and the Creation of Statelessness among 
Palestinians 
The roots of the Palestinian refugee problem are to be found in British colonial 
policies. After Britain entered and occupied Palestine, under the legal approval of 
the League of Nations, colonial authorities began organising and facilitating the 
mass immigration of Jews from Europe, in an effort to fulfil the Zionist political 
project.159 Britain promised in the 1917 Balfour Declaration to create a Jewish 
state in Palestine,160 without consulting native populations. In 1947, the United 
Nations presented a partition plan to create a Zionist State in Palestine, which 
would allocate only 45% of the land to Palestinians although they owed 93% of 
it.161 Native Palestinians and Arab neighbouring states strongly rejected this 
proposal, which they saw as a continuity of colonialism, and a war broke out as a 
result.162 The new state of Israel, militarily and politically supported by Britain 
and France, won the 1947–48 conflict and forcibly expelled 750,000 Palestinians 
from their homes — which represented around 85% of the indigenous population 
of former British Mandate Palestine.163 The majority of them were internally 
displaced or sought refuge in the neighbouring countries of Lebanon, Jordan, Syria 
and Iraq.164 This event is known in the Palestinian consciousness as the ‘Nakba’ 
— literally ‘catastrophe’ in Arabic — and marked the beginning of their forced 
exile and statelessness that still remains unresolved to this day.165 It also marked 
the beginning of the dispersal of the Palestinian community and their political 
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struggle for self-determination.166 Around half a million Palestinians sought 
refuge in Syria during the Nakba. The 1967 Arab–Israeli war has further led to the 
displacement of more than 300,000 Palestinians.167 Moreover, Israeli is illegally 
occupying the Syrian Golan Heights, a territory populated by around 25,000 
Syrian Druze. The vast majority of them are stateless because they strongly reject 
Israeli citizenship, and still hope to rejoin Syria one day.168 The creation and 
existence of the state of Israel is the continuation of European colonialism in a 
vacuum, not just because of the Balfour Declaration, but also through the ongoing 
settler-colonialism and a visible remnant of hegemony.169 The creation of the state 
of Israel was motivated by racial hierarchies and colonial ideas, as illustrated by 
the following quote of Winston Churchill addressing Palestinians in 1937: 
I do not admit … that a great wrong has been done to the red Indians of America 
or the black people of Australia. I do not admit that a wrong has been done to these 
people by the fact that a stronger race, a higher-grade race, a more worldly-wise 
race to put it that way, has come in and taken their place.170 
Therefore, Britain denied sovereignty to Palestinian people not because of a 
historical mistake, but because they saw native populations as an inferior race 
undeserving of human rights. Colonial policies enacted by Britain are responsible 
for engendering the mass displacement, ongoing statelessness, and enduring 
suffering of the Palestinian people.  
B The Legal Status of Palestinians in Syrian Nationality Law 
Before the outbreak of the Syrian conflict, there were approximately 1 million 
Palestinian refugees living in Syria — from which 560,000 were officially 
registered.171 Pursuant to Syrian legislation, Palestinians enjoy equal rights 
regarding ‘employment, work, business and military service without prejudice to 
their original nationality’.172 In addition to economic rights, Palestinians are 
entitled to free secondary education and equal access to Syrian universities.173 In 
terms of mobility, they enjoy the same rights as Syrian nationals: they are entitled 
to travel documents, that can be obtained or extended via any Syrian embassy 
abroad, which allow them to re-enter Syria and take up residence there — no 
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matter the length of time they might have spent abroad.174 They can also access 
social benefits provided by the Syrian government on a par with citizens.175 
According to Reeds, ‘Palestinian refugees in Syria enjoy equality with Syrian 
citizens in most aspects of their lives and have achieved a significant degree of 
integration’.176 Nonetheless, Palestinians remain still excluded from political 
rights — such as voting or standing for in parliamentary elections — despite being 
required to perform the military service.177 This constitutes a legal anomaly, since 
military service normally goes hand-in-hand with citizenship. The Constitution of 
the Syrian Arab Republic itself refers to military service as a duty of all male 
citizens.178  
Palestinians who have been living in Syria for seven decades and are treated on 
an equal basis with nationals remain excluded from the naturalisation process 
because of the 1965 Protocol for the Treatment of Palestinians in Arab States, also 
known as the ‘Casablanca Protocol’.179 The Protocol, adopted by the LAS, 
regulates the rights and obligations of Palestinian refugees living in Arabic-
speaking countries.180 According to this instrument, host Arab states are bound to 
treat Palestinians on an equal basis with non-nationals and ensure their legal status 
is fully secured.181 That includes equal economic rights,182 the right to leave and 
return to the state they are residing in183 and equal rights with citizens regarding 
visas and residency.184 State-parties are also required to issue refugee travel 
documents to allow Palestinians to move across borders whilst maintaining their 
refugee status.185 Overall, this treaty is based on a rights-based approach that 
ensures Palestinians are treated on an equal basis with citizens. However, one 
major controversial feature of the treaty is the opposition to naturalisation: [3] of 
the Protocol’s preamble states that Palestinians shall not be granted the nationality 
of the host state in order to preserve their ‘national identity’.186 This provision was 
introduced on the ground that naturalisation would undermine the Palestinians’ 
right of return to their ancestral lands, a right enhanced in UN resolutions.187  
Yet, this view does not find any support in international law nor history. 
Naturalisation of refugees in the host state has never been incompatible with the 
right of return. Still, the LAS decided to enact this provision in 1965, in the hope 
that Palestinians would, one day, be able to return. The current political context 
shows little probability for the realisation of this right. Palestinian refugees remain, 
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nonetheless, excluded from naturalisation in host Arab countries — including in 
Syria. Their identity documents are not equivalent to a citizenship and Palestinians 
remain de jure stateless. This situation of legal insecurity has been further 
exacerbated by the Syrian conflict. Before the war broke out, Syria hosted two 
main Palestinian refugee camps: (i) Yarmouk camp located near Damascus where 
approximately 160,000 Palestinian refugees were living; and (ii) De’raa camp in 
southern Syria was home to 10,000 people. Both refugee camps have been the 
scene of violent unrest and fights between Syrian authorities and armed groups.188 
There are now only 1,000 people left in Yarmouk, and less than 400 families in 
De’raa.189 Palestinians from Syria who fled to neighbouring countries are 
particularly vulnerable because of their exclusion from Syrian citizenship. The 
legal situation of the Kurdish community of Syria is even more precarious, as the 
next sub-Part elucidates. 
C Kurdish Syrians: When Ethnic Identities Meet Stateless Identities 
With an estimated number of 35 million people, the Kurdish community is referred 
to as ‘the largest stateless nation in the world’.190 Similar to the Palestinians, they 
are united through ethnicity, culture, history and language — although they do not 
share a common dialect.191 They used to have their own independent state, in the 
form of a kingdom, before the invasion by the Ottomans in the 13th century.192 
And, again, like the Palestinians, the dislocation of the Ottoman Empire by 
victorious European powers left them with no land. They ended up divided among 
the four modern states of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.193 It is estimated that the 
Kurds in Syria represent about 10% of the total Syrian population.194  
On 5 October 1962, Syrian authorities enacted a census in the Kurdish-
populated governorate of Al-Hasaka in northern Syria.195 The former Syrian 
Government196 argued that, from 1945 onwards, many migrants crossed the 
Turkish–Syrian border irregularly and established themselves in Syria by using 
falsified identity documents.197 According to this point of view, the 1962 census 
committee was conducted to identify these migrants and at repealing the Syrian 
nationality they supposedly obtained fraudulently.198 Syrian authorities provided 
less than 24 hours to the inhabitants of the province of Al-Hasaka to provide 
documents proving their lawful residency prior to 1945. The outcome of the 1962 
census led to the identification of three categories of population: 
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i. Those able to prove their residency prior to 1945 were recognised as Syrian 
nationals. 
ii. Those who attempted to prove their residency by providing documentation 
but failed to convince Syrian authorities were classified as Ajnabi — 
‘foreigners’ in Arabic. They have been officially recorded in a civil register 
of foreigners and have been given a ‘red card’.199 Holders of these cards 
are allowed ‘leave to remain’ in Syria but have no right to return if they 
leave the country for whatever reason.  
iii. Those who did not have any documentation, were absent, or refused to take 
part in the census were deemed Maktoumeen — ‘concealed’ in Arabic. 
They are undocumented residents who are not even considered as 
foreigners. Their personal data was not registered in any official record and 
they are considered as residing unlawfully in Syria.200 
Since both Ajnabi and Maktoumeen did not hold any other nationality than the 
Syrian one, they were consequently rendered stateless. As a result of this census, 
120,000 Kurds — representing around 20% of the total Kurdish Syrian population 
— lost their citizenship. Although Syria is not a party to the 1954 and 1961 
Statelessness Conventions, it has ratified many international human rights 
conventions that protect the right to a nationality and expressly prohibit 
deprivation of citizenship when it leads to statelessness.201 Moreover, there were 
significant inconsistencies and irregularities in the implementation of the 1962 
census, making it a highly arbitrary process.202 First of all, it was carried out during 
a brief period of 24 hours only, which left no time to the inhabitants of the Al-
Hasaka province to collect the necessary documents, or even to understand what 
was happening, and the process automatically excluded people who were not 
present on the relevant day.203 According to a Syrian lawyer, ‘thousands of people 
went to sleep as Syrians and woke up to find that they no longer were [citizens]’.204 
Because the census was carried out during one single day, testimonies argue that 
decisions of registration were rushed and deficient, and designed to deprive a large 
minority of their political weight in the new-born state.205 Furthermore, the decree 
only left three months to appeal the decision of revoking Syrian citizenship.206 
Zahra Albarazi posits that, given the ‘deficiency’ of the government and of judicial 
institutions at the time, it was arduous to lodge an appeal and seek justice in any 
effective way.207 One Kurdish Syrian, deprived of his citizenship during the 
census explained how he tried to restore his citizenship by lodging numerous 
requests respectively in 1970, 1980 and 1988 before Syrian authorities. His 
demands were dismissed each time on the ground that ‘he is from the people of 
Al-Hasaka governorate’.208 Therefore, this example illustrates how Syrian 
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citizenship is racialised, a legacy that can be traced back to the racialisation of 
communities during French colonial rule.209 
The 1962 census deprived Kurdish communities of their political, economic 
and civil rights, and their everyday life became extremely difficult, particularly in 
terms of access to education and employment.210 They faced difficulty in 
registering their children at birth and sending them to school, and were banned 
from working in the public sector and benefit from ratio foods, which were 
reserved to Syrian citizens — because they were now considered ‘foreigners’. 
Additionally, this census prevented them from travelling because of their lack of 
identity documentation. In the 1990s, Syrian authorities expelled stateless Kurds 
from their homes and arbitrarily seized their agricultural lands.211 Many who tried 
to peacefully protest against this decision were arrested and detained, and some 
were sentenced to up to four years imprisonment.212 Therefore, the 1962 census 
appears to be a political decision motivated by ethnic-based discrimination, rather 
than immigration concerns. The census left long-lasting marks that still have 
consequences to this day. In the early years of the Syrian conflict, many Kurdish 
Syrians were put in detention because of their inability to present identity 
documents at checkpoints.213 When fleeing Syria, they have also found themselves 
excluded from some resettlement programs available to other vulnerable refugees 
in neighbouring countries, because they could not prove their Syrian 
nationality.214  
In 2011, the Syrian regime started to make concessions in an attempt to pacify 
the political tensions in the country, after the outbreak of popular uprisings across 
the country and shortly before the civil war officially began.215 A first decree 
allowed the Ajnabi to access social services216 and a second one stated that they 
should be treated on an equal basis with Syrian nationals in terms of 
employment.217 Finally, on 7 March 2011, President Bashar Al-Assad issued a 
decree that granted the Syrian nationality to all the Ajnabi living in the province 
of Al-Hasaka at that point — but not to all the Syrian Ajnabi that may have moved 
to other parts of the country since the census took place.218 Before the census, the 
Syrian regime had dismissed all demands calling for the naturalisation of stateless 
Kurds, arguing that naturalisation could only be made on an individual basis.219 
Nonetheless, this decree was granted as a ‘favour’, rather than as the rectification 
of a legal breach committed through the defective census process. No 
compensation or reparation was offered.220 Many Kurds had fled Syria before 
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having the opportunity to apply for citizenship under the decree.221 Moreover, the 
Maktoumeen remain stateless and the Syrian regime has made no call to resolve 
their situation. Overall, the 1961 census and the 2011 decree thus illustrate how 
states can manipulate nationality rules for political purposes. By stripping Kurds 
of their citizenship, the Syrian regime rendered their presence unlawful and made 
them feel like they do not ‘belong’. Yet, Kurds have nowhere to seek refuge 
because the Anglo–French alliance broke their initial commitment to create a 
Kurdish independent state, and deprived Kurds off their right to self-determination 
as a result. 
 ARBITRARY DENATIONALISATION IN SYRIAN LEGISLATION 
Denationalisation procedures were originally theorised and practiced in the United 
Kingdom and France, to be later exported all over Europe.222 They initially 
appeared in the 19th century and were used as a form of punishment towards 
citizens who were considered ‘unloyal’ or ‘dangerous’. Citizenship-stripping 
gradually disappeared because it was deemed incompatible with the nation-state 
system in which states reciprocally respected each other’s right to control their 
borders and populations, and therefore the right to expel foreigners in their 
territory under certain circumstances.223 International law strictly prohibits 
deprivation of citizenship if it is arbitrary, unlawful, based on discriminatory 
grounds or when it leads to statelessness.224 However, citizenship-stripping has 
recently reappeared in Europe in the last decade, within the context of anti-
terrorism measures and the issue of ‘foreign fighters’ wishing to return back 
home.225 
French colonial rule has introduced and significantly influenced Syrian 
legislation on de-nationalisation procedures.226 Article 21 of the Syrian 
Nationality Law lists several grounds on which Syrians might be stripped off their 
nationality.227 Those include ‘citizens who reside in a non-Arab country for more 
than three years and who do not respond to requests for a justification of their 
absence within three months, or provide an insufficient response’.228 This 
provision does not define what constitutes sufficient justification or through which 
means it can be proven, leaving complete discretion to the Syrian authorities. It is 
a carte blanche for the stripping of Syrian nationality that can be strategically used 
against political opponents or against members of specific minorities, and there is 
no safeguard to which the individual can have recourse, such as the right of appeal. 
Article 21 has, effectively, being used for political purposes by the Syrian regime: 
in the 1960s and 1970s, President Hafez Al-Assad arbitrarily denationalised 
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27,000 political opponents — leaving them stateless.229 Children of political 
opponents are still forced to live in exile and denied Syrian citizenship.230 
Historically, denationalisation policies have been largely used to target specific 
minorities who, despite possessing the citizenship of the country of residence, are 
considered as foreigners to the community.231 According to the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, more than 75% of the world’s stateless 
population are from minority groups.232 It is on this basis that the Kurds of Syria 
were denationalised in 1962, with the stated purpose of identifying ‘illegal 
migrants’ clearly being a facade.233 In a response to a report from Human Rights 
Watch documenting the situation of stateless Kurds in Syria,234 Syrian authorities 
argued that, around 1945, many Kurds from Turkey had ‘infiltrated’ Syria.235 This 
dehumanising language reflects the disdain of Syrian authorities towards the 
Kurdish community.236 All successive Syrian governments have persecuted and 
discriminated the Kurds, both in the law and in practice.237 Indeed, history 
illustrates this strong link between ethnic-based discrimination and citizenship 
stripping. During World War I, Australia, for example, excluded Japanese citizens 
from naturalisation because they were considered as ‘ethically undesirable’.238 In 
Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, denationalisation procedures were used against 
political opponents239 and as part of an ethnic cleansing process targeting 
homosexuals, the Jewish community and Roma people.240  
Likewise, the recent resurgence of denationalisation procedures within in 
Europe has been criticised for targeting dual nationals, thereby creating a group of 
‘second-class citizens’.241 Overall, denationalisations practices in Syria should be 
read in conjunction with anticolonial history, rather than as a simple product of 
discrimination and arbitrariness. Citizenship stripping was theorised within 
Europe and introduced in Syria during colonial rule. Moreover, denationalisations 
practiced by European states have served as a model to the Syrian legislation, in 
an effort to target citizens deemed ‘undeserving’ of state protection.  
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Western academic literature has traditionally identified contemporary causes of 
statelessness as principally stemming from discriminatory state policies and has 
largely ignored the legacies and heritage of colonialism in post-coloniality. This 
paper aimed to fill this research gap by demonstrating how, in the Syrian context, 
colonial legacies have played a decisive role in creating discrimination in 
nationality laws, which has resulted in mass statelessness. By relying on a TWAIL 
methodology that focuses on the historical formation of the law, this analysis has 
sought to uncover the hidden colonial legacies at the root causes of discrimination 
in Syrian citizenship and resulting cases of statelessness. 
Firstly, this article has demonstrated how European colonial policies in the 
Middle East have created a mismatch between identity and nationality. The 
creation of artificial borders in the Sykes–Picot Agreements, motivated by the 
desire to divide colonised populations, is one of the roots of statelessness in 
modern Syria. This paper has, secondly, demonstrated how the dislocation of the 
Ottoman Empire by European colonial powers and the creation of artificial states 
has impacted upon the formation of new state citizenries and the emergence of 
stateless populations, including the Kurds and the Palestinians. Both communities 
were denied the right to self-sovereignty by colonial powers, on the basis of 
racialist hierarchies. 
 Thirdly, the transposition of gender-based discrimination by French colonial 
power during the occupation has created patriarchal citizenship rules that have 
increased the risk of statelessness. Gender inequality in Syrian citizenship is not 
the result of a backward culture or religion, but results from French colonial rule. 
In fact, this historical analysis has revealed that Syrian women enjoyed more rights 
regarding citizenship before French colonial rule. A similar provision, stripping 
women of their right to pass on their citizenship to their children, was introduced 
by British colonisers in other territories. Fourthly and finally, this paper ended by 
critically reflecting upon the arbitrary processes of naturalisation and 
denationalisation, largely inspired by Western practices. Overall, this analysis has 
challenged the idea that discriminatory practices in Syrian citizenship are the result 
of ‘lawlessness’ or an ‘uncivilised’ culture. It, rather, bears the legacy of the 
devasting impacts of European colonialism. 
The present analysis has demonstrated that, far from bringing ‘civilisation’ or 
‘modernity’, colonialism has brought nothing more than division, discrimination 
and stripped populations off their right to self-determination. Notably, gender-
based discriminatory provisions in Syrian nationality law were introduced by the 
French colonial administration, stripping Syrian women of a right they previously 
enjoyed under Ottoman rule. As a result, current patriarchal laws cannot be 
attributed to the supposedly ‘backwardness’ and sexism inherent to Arab culture. 
Likewise, nationality provisions that favour Arab citizens were shaped by anti-
colonial struggles and cannot be read as a simple translation of ethnic-based 
discrimination. Overall, colonial legacies remain at the heart of current 
discrimination in Syrian nationality rules. Whilst it does not justify that the Syrian 
legislator is still maintaining such discrimination, it does offer a colonial 
explanation.  
Beyond the Syrian case, this paper revealed the central role played by 
colonialism in creating statelessness and discrimination in citizenship. 
Mainstream narratives presuppose that statelessness is the result of current 




discriminatory practices adopted by modern states, largely neglecting the impact 
of colonialism. This paper demonstrated the shortcomings of such analysis, in 
failing to take into consideration the legacies of colonialism in creating mass 
statelessness. Citizenship and statelessness are not simply the expression of 
modern state power, but also reflect unequal power relations amongst states — 
namely between the colonised and the coloniser. This component should not be 
neglected when analysing citizenship and statelessness in former colonies. A 
critical historical analysis of the formation of citizenship in former colonies can 
help revealing the role of colonialism in creating statelessness. 
